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A b s t r a c t
The paper assesses the developments in the current accounts of transition countries in
Central, Baltic and South-Eastern Europe. Attention is given to policy issues, such as the
relationship between savings, investments and government deficits, reinvested profits, official
transfers from the European Commission and private transfers.
The overall situation in the sustainability of current account deficits in studied transition
countries is characterised as steadily improving and the majority of economies reached a stage
where the current account is not an immanent threat to their growth any longer. However,
economic policies in many of the countries need important adjustments in order to keep the
economies in macroeconomic equilibrium. Particularly the trade deficit has been causing
problems to external equilibrium. It is apparent that fiscal deficits, that have been on a rise in
the last 2-3 years, are becoming the dominant factor behind the current account disequlibria.
Reinvested profits of foreign investors and current transfers have been becoming gradually the
instrument for bringing the current account deficits closer to their sustainable levels. The
balance between the repatriation of profits by foreign investors and the reinvestment of such
profits in the transition economies will play more important role in the future  developments in
the current account deficits or even surpluses.
Caveat for the readers:
A part of this analysis was used by United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, in their
Economic Survey of Europe, no. 1, 2004. This text therefore differs from the text finally
published by UNECE both in contents and editing. For the purposes of quoting the official
document, please turn at its final version at http://www.unece.org/ead/pub/041/041c3.pdf.1/  State of Current Accounts in General
The year of 2003 was a sort of a milestone in the developments of the transition
countries in this part of Europe. The times of high inflation and chronic unsustainable external
deficits were definitely closed in practically all of these countries and the 14 years of
transformation if finally promising its fruits. The growth rates of the region are markedly faster
than in the western part of Europe and the scenarios of convergence could finally become more
optimistic as ever before.
The current account (C/A) balances in most east European countries remained in deficit
in 2003, as we can see from Table 1 in the appendix. However recent developments suggest
that, in terms of their external financial positions, several of these economies may be
approaching a post-transition phase.  Thus in some of the more advanced economies (especially
among the EU acceding countries) seem to be reaching a point when the access to financial
capital is no longer a constraint for their development.  In addition, the C/A deficits in the
majority of the acceding countries seem to be stabilising; the surpluses on the balances of
services and transfers largely offset the deficits on the balance of incomes.1  The favourable
performance in the C/A was to a large extent conditioned by highly satisfactory results in the
trade balance in the majority of countries. The growth of  merchandise exports retained their
high rate of expansion practically for the whole decade (see Table 2). Nine out of twelve central
and Eastern European countries had a growth rate in nominal dollars higher than 10% per year
for more than a decade. Estonia and Hungary being the champions beating the growth rate of
15% p.a. The capacity of transition countries at a higher level of transformation to penetrate on
the world (and especially on the EU markets) is one of the best signals that these countries offer
to the analysts of their performance. That was also reflected in high FDI inflows coming to
these countries in recent years.
Table 3 presents a more detailed information about the performance of exports and
imports of some central European countries and the regions. Year 2003 was another successful
period for the export expansion for many transition countries. The mutual penetration between
the EU and CEE markets was the main driver of the trade creation. However, there is a caveat to
the figures used. The US dollar depreciated relative to euro (main trade currency of transition
countries) by 17% in 2003. Thus the trade figures in real terms (e.g. in constant EUR) is lower
by approximately 19% than what is indicated as a growth in nominal USD for 2003. The
mounting problems of the Hungarian economy are apparent from its trade behaviour. The
developments in the Estonian huge and deepening trade deficit is particularly causing concerns
about its sustainability without major policy changes.
The problems leaking to the whole economy from the large and rising trade deficits were
fortunately cushioned in nearly all CEE countries by positive balances in the trade with services
and private remittances. In 2003 there were only few exceptions that would raise worries about
the sustainability of the current account deficits. We should mention Estonia that is heading
towards a record deficit of over 14% of GDP due to imports related not only to high
                                                
1 Reporting the deficits in US dollars induces a bias in the ratios in periods of increased volatility of the
dollar exchange rate (as was the case in 2003, when the dollar deficits are likely overstated).  However,
taking the deficit as a proportion to GDP eliminates this bias.investments but also to rising private consumption.  Similar concerns about the current accounts
could be raised for Latvia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro and probably
Bulgaria (whose deficit rose rapidly in the second half of the year).
Another problem that emerged only recently is the sharp plunge in inward FDI
experienced by some east European countries.  While in 2002 the total FDI inflows in Eastern
Europe could finance more than the region’s aggregate current account deficit, in 2003 the
aggregate FDI inflow was only half that size.  But growing workers’ remittances from abroad
helped alleviate the pressure on short-term borrowing to finance these deficits.
The new developments mentioned above may in fact indicate a turning point in the
development path of some of these economies, especially the acceding countries, after a decade
and a half of economic transformation.  The deepening of economic integration with the more
developed EU economies and the emergence of new factors (both in the real economy and in
the financial sphere) may be bringing a gradual reversal in the net balance of FDI, while the
negative balances of trade will decline and the balances of incomes and transfers may keep
diverging. The functioning of this mechanism at the macroeconomic level deserves a special
attention.
2/  Economic Linkages between the Current Account and the Domestic Economy
The current account of the balance of payments of an open economy reflects the sources
and the uses of national income that are related to exports and imports of goods and services,
and to international transfers of income related to factors (capital and labour) or consumer
spending. This leads to the so-called fundamental macroeconomic identities of an open
economy:
(X-M) ≡ If ,  i.e. the current account is equal to the consolidated capital and financial
accounts of the balance of payments, and
(X-M) ≡ S + (T-G) – I,  i.e. the current account is the difference between residents’
savings (private and public) and their investments.
Thus external disequilibria (both real and monetary) are closely tied to internal
disequilibria, such as disequilibria in growth, employment or prices. If it is desirable that the
expenditure of country’s residents on consumption, investment, government services and
imports (as recorded by the national absorption A) should be higher than the national product Y,
then this is possible only if external financing for such additional items of national absorption is
found abroad: A + (X-M) ≡ Y. Such additional resource (If) is equal to the absolute value of the
current account deficit, i.e. to (X-M) that is negative. In another words, if private and public
savings of a country are not sufficient for financing the required investments for restructuring,
then foreign funds must be acquired and used on the real side. However, not all countries and
their economic agents find this kind of policy the most appropriate one.
Current account deficit must be looked upon as on a very sensitive and tempting
investment where short-term and long-term costs and benefits may diverge significantly. All
such deficits are essentially debts that will have to be sooner or later serviced, including the
foreign direct investment. According to Woodward, 2001, he implicit real interest is in average16 per cent p.a.2 Naturally the spread varies by countries, their creditworthiness and the
riskiness of investments. There are various additional burdens to be borne by the recipient
countries. Many governments offer the large international investors various incentives. In the
Czech case such incentives represent an equivalent of 20% interest premium on the total
amount invested. In addition, many MNC are tempted to use transfer pricing for the
optimisation of their net profits3. Some countries may pay a heavy price for their role as hosts to
foreign investors.
A caution must be also raised if the borrowed foreign funds are not associated with the
build-up of physical capital, human capital and competitiveness, but channelled instead into
imports for consumption or used inefficiently. Unfortunately elasticity of imports to aggregate
domestic demand in economies at a low level of transformation is often significantly above
unity and the income elasticity of domestic production for import replacements is less than
unity.4 Under such conditions, any growth driven by the expansion on the demand side gets
stranded at an unsustainable current account deficit. The danger is even augmented if the
parallel fiscal deficit is channelled via non-restructured public sector and/or its beneficiaries act
under soft budget constraint. Such “public dissaving” leads quickly to the accumulation of
foreign public indebtedness, crowding out of private investments and even increased private
savings (in the so-called effect of Ricardian equivalence) that decrease consumption. It also
tends to generate inflationary expectations weakening of the exchange rate. The investors are
then prone to accelerate the problem by capital flight ending in a financial crisis, restrictive
fiscal and monetary policies and an economic stagnation.
In the early stages of economic transformation, the scarcity of capital was one of the
main constraints to growth because the transition had virtually written-off a large part of the
physical capital endowments.  In the later stages of transition, additional capital was needed for
the upgrading of human capital.  Raising capital abroad and channelling it to such types of
investment was definitely beneficial for the transition economies.5  After 1995, this powerful
instrument of economic restructuring was actively used by most east European economies.
Their current accounts and balances of trade were generally negative throughout the transition
period (Table 4).  Therefore, the ruling present policy of running current account deficits in
Eastern Europe can be often viewed in a highly positive manner.  Subject to the caveats raised
in the preceding paragraphs, large deficits can often indicate that the country undergoes
successful restructuring and that investors assess positively its future growth potential.  Thus for
                                                
2 Woodward, D.: The Next Crisis? Direct and Equity Investment in Developing Countries. London, Zed
Books, 2001.
3 Kreinin, M.: International Economics - A Policy Approach. Dryden, Philadelphia, 1998, p. 235.
4 By comparing the growth rates of the aggregate domestic demand with the growth rates of real
imports we can see that the index of average demand elasticity of imports in the majority of transition
countries was between 5 and 9 during the whole 1990s. The elasticity of domestic import replacements
relative to the aggregate demand was at the same time close to zero or, most probably, even negative.
5 According to the growth theory, an additional access to savings (and thus investment) shifts upwards
the long-term steady state; such economy will enjoy larger capital stock, faster growth and higher final
level of output than would be otherwise plausible.  G. Mankiw, D. Romer and D. N. Weil, “A
Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992, Vol. 107,
No.2, pp. 407-437.the most part of the transition, current account deficits in Eastern Europe were by and large
financed by net FDI inflows or they can be reduced in the near future because of the expected
rise in domestic profits and savings. The dividends of years of intensive transformation,
continuing microeconomic and institutional stabilisation, and the EU accession in 2004 offer
now more grounds for sanguinity in this part of Europe as ever before.
3/  Threats of Twin Deficits and the Better Side of the Reinvested Profits
More recent developments, such as the recent financial turmoil in Hungary (UNECE,
2004, pp. 76-77), bid for some more caution regarding the future.  In Hungary’s case, the roots
of the problem should be traced to high government spending before and after the 2002
elections (the government deficit reached 9.2% of the GDP in 2002).  The lesson from this
experience is that extensive and not properly targeted demand-side stimulation can have
destabilising side-effects even in the most advanced east European economies.  Poland’s
unbalanced growth path prior to the slowdown in 2001 also demonstrates the dangers of an
external disequilibrium associated with an inconsistent policy mix.6  The policy adjustment in
2001 has contributed to the reduction in the current account deficit (Table 1) but at the expense
of a considerable economic slowdown. While Poland does not seem to face balance of
payments constraints at present, the intended further raising of the budget deficit in 2004 is not
without its risks.7
Policy makers in Eastern Europe also need to take into account the potential risks
associated with twin deficits, moreover, given the recent deterioration in the public financial
balances in some of these countries.8 Hitting thus an unsustainable knife-edge situation of
running the fiscal and C/A deficit in parallel is still dormant in this part of Europe.9 Their re-
emergence may loom easily if the sources of generous FDI inflows dwindle (what is a present
problem of Hungary) or if the net investment income deficit deepens, or if the governments lose
their additional revenues from the privatisation of state-owned property. As Table 1 illustrates
in the last three columns, countries like Slovakia, Bulgaria or Czech Republic could finance the
current account deficits more than easily from FDI. However, that cannot be said for Bosnia,
Estonia, four south Eastern European countries and also partially for Hungary. In addition, with
the privatisation coming to an end in most of Eastern Europe, the financing of the fiscal deficits
is going to be much more difficult to cover from the tax revenues alone.
                                                
6 See UNECE, Economic Survey of Europe, 2002, No. 1, pp. 63-69.
7 Another example is the Czech financial crisis in 1997 rooted in an unbalanced growth supported by
easy access to state banks’ credits (UNECE, Economic Survey of Europe, 1998, No. 1, pp. 75-82).  The
surfacing of huge accumulated contingent fiscal liabilities still remain a large burden on Czech public
finances (this step of the Czech fiscal reform is due to be closed in 2006).
8 As discussed above, one of the main ingredients of a twin deficit crisis is the failure to channel the
additionally mobilized resources into productive investments and/or into the growth-enhancing public
investment.
9 While the current account deficits are to large extent objective phenomena, the fiscal deficits are
purely contrived and subject to political cycles. The idea of subjecting the decisions about the size of
deficits to processes of democratic accountability, instead of leaving them to politicians alone, does notAnother topic that entered the public policy debates in Eastern Europe only recently
concerns the flow of earnings by non-resident direct investors.  Thus reinvested earnings are
recorded twice: first as debits in the income balance of the current account, similarly like
dividends or repatriated profits. Then there is a countervailing credit entry in the financial
account marking it as an FDI inflow.  With the growth in the FDI stock, reinvested earnings
begin to play a much more visible role in influencing the balance of payments and at some point
they may start to dominate the total FDI inflows.  As a result, the current account balances of
such countries will be more exposed to the decisions by foreign direct investors: to their
dividend policy and to their investment policy – whether they repatriate or re-invest their profits
in the host country.
For example, foreign direct investors in Hungary reinvest at present a little more than 50
per cent of their local profits and only the rest is repatriated.10  Similarly, reinvested earnings in
the Czech Republic amounted to $2.7 billion in 2002 and $3.4 billion in 2003.  In the cases
when large current account deficit merely reflects the large amounts of reinvested earnings by
foreign direct investors, these deficits need not be a source of policy concern.  On the contrary,
such an outcome indicates not only that the local FDI ventures are highly profitable but also that
investors consider them as worth expanding even further. In addition, there is no need to finance
such “debts” through the foreign exchange market.11
From among the accession countries only Estonia had in 2003 a current account deficit
above 10 per cent of GDP (for a second consecutive year) and it is financed mainly through
short-term foreign borrowing by commercial banks.  Although the confidence in the currency
board, backed by Estonia’s upgraded credit rating of A1, remains high at the beginning of 2004,
the economy remains exposed to the risk of a sudden reversal in these flows, which may cause a
squeeze on the foreign exchange market.
4/ Official and Private Transfers of the Current Account
EU enlargement is going to have some important implications for the balance of current
transfers of the acceding countries concerning both the official and the private transfers.  The
total amount of the official EU transfers for the eight acceding east European countries in the
period 2004-2006 was set at the Copenhagen meeting in December 2002 at  €40.852 billion (at
1999 prices), defined as structured ceilings to the EU commitments.12  In addition, there was
                                                                                                                                                           
apply to emerging market countries only. See C. Wyplosz, Fiscal Discipline in Emerging Market
Countries: How to go about It?, 2002, paper available at http://heiwww.unige.ch/~wyplosz/.
10 Until now, the Hungarian balance of payments statistics, counter to the internationally accepted
standards, omits the item of reinvested profits.  If a corresponding adjustment is made to the Hungarian
balance of payments, the Hungarian current account deficit would increase from 4.1 to 6.1 per cent in
2002 and from 6.4 to 8.6 per cent in 2003, respectively.  Estimates published in Hungarian National
Bank, Quarterly Report on Inflation (Budapest), November 2003, pp. 51-53.
11 J. Brada and V. Tomšík, Reinvested Earnings Bias, The “Five Percent” Rule and the Interpretation
of the Balance of Payments – With an Application to Transition Economies. WDI Working Paper no.
543, February 2003, available at http://eres.bus.umich.edu/docs/workpap-dav/wp543.pdf.
12 See The Adjustment of the Financial Perspective for Enlargement, European Commission,
11.2.2003,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financialfrwk/enlarg/COM_2003_0070_F_EN_ACTE.pdf.created an emergency supplement to the budget of €10.2 billion (at maximum) for 2004.  Table
5 shows in detail the structure of such commitments.
After deducting the membership contributions of the eight countries estimated totally for
all three years at €14 billion, the net enlargement transfers for 2004-2006 could be as high as
€26 billion. In terms of annual costs for the population of the current 15 EU members, this
amounts to approximately €26 per capita per annum, at maximum. The envisaged gross
transfers amount to 3.6 per cent of the combined GDP of the acceding countries, varied from
2.2 per cent for Slovenia up to 7.1 per cent for Lithuania, as the upper limits of the planned
gross transfers for these countries. The planned allocations to structural and cohesion funds are
approximately 1.9 per cent of the countries’ GDP. This is close to what the four poorest
“cohesion” EU countries were concretely receiving during the 1994-1999 period - i.e. some 2.2
per cent of their aggregate GDP. However, the planned budget figures represent only the EU
commitment funds, conditioned by a set of criteria and domestic co-financing.  The effective
financing in absolute amounts may thus turn out to be much less generous than what the limits
for commitment seem to offer. The enlargement thus triggered a series of demands for revisions
and belt tightening. That is not a bad signal for those who believe that the Commission should
be always kept under a pressure for adjustments, otherwise it would become an institution
losing the contact with reality.
The overall real impact of the net EU transfers on the future current account balances of
the new members is therefore difficult to estimate. Some studies, like those by C. Viprey and C.
Moquet  13, speak about realistic 62% of the potential appropriations.  This implies that new
members, but especially those less prepared for fund-seeking activities, might eventually
become net contributors to the EU budget in the first years. Thus the effective real
appropriations can vary from zero per cent up to 4 per cent of GDP in 2005, with estimated
average of 1.6% for the whole group of acceding countries. Although the last EU enlargement
was the biggest in the EU history, the burden it explicitly brought on the Commission’s budget
is one of the lowest. The question is whether the present budget economising strategy would
sustainable also in the long run. If the lagging East European economies and the dissatisfied
population of new members would become a cause of discord even among the past incumbents,
bringing the cohesion of EU’s decision-making to a halt, it would be advisable to revise the
present budget tightening policies and re-install the more generous structural policies that
existed prior to enlargement.
The appropriations by individual countries are not allocated identically among them,
neither in the proportion to the GDP nor proportionally per capita, as can be seen from Table 6.
For example, if the average of agricultural transfers per capita for all accession countries is
normalised to unity (1.00), then Czech agricultural appropriation would be 0.84 - that means
only 84% of the average amount per capita - while Lithuania would get 159% of the average
quota.
One may wonder what were the guidelines for such asymmetric decision making at the
European Commission? On what grounds did the EC decide about the maximal limits of
structural and agricultural transfers for seven countries poorer than Greece or Portugal, which
under the rules valid since 1989 should receive funds up to 4% of their GDP, instead of the
                                                
13 Available at http://www.dree.org/elargissement/_private/abs_ged.cfm? IDDocument=47779.expected 1.6%. A simple regression might offer some clues. For example, the average maximal
limit of 1.82% of the GDP, as a promise for potential structural payments, is less than 3.5% and
3.7% what Greece and Portugal actually received in 1994-99. It is clear that the present eight
poorest EU members will receive less than what Portugal or Greece received per capita or per
GDP, both in structural and agricultural interventions.
We have tested regressions where the rates of EU structural transfers to ten new entrants
(i.e. annual interventions per recipient country's GDP taken as the endogenous variable) were a
function of their nominal GDP per capita (at EUR at current exchange rate). The following
statistical characteristics were received by estimating our hypothesis as a power function, after
taking its natural logarithms. The rate of structural transfers (RST/2004-06), defined as a
percentage share of EU transfers on nominal GDP 14, was “explained” by the function:
Ln (RST) = 15.7 -1.75 * Ln (GDP per capita) + Ln (ε)
R-squared adj.: 0.968 (!)
Durbin-Watson test: 1.58
P-significance of both coefficients: 0.000.
By generalising the economic meaning of the estimated coefficients, each increase of
GDP per capita by 1% implies a decrease in the rate of structural transfers per GDP by 1.75%.
All that should be taken relative to Latvia - the poorest country that received the highest offer
(4,14% of GDP annually) for structural funding. It implies that, if the error term ε is
disregarded, a country with the GDP per capita higher than 7863 EUR should receive a token
structural transfer of 1% only. If this logic would be applied for all EU countries, the poorer
regions of Greece, Portugal, Spain or Germany would get an amount much lower than what they
were accustomed to until now. Doubtless that would be a move difficult to accept without
concessions elsewhere.
Similarly, the logic behind the rate of agricultural transfers (RAT/2004-06, defined as a
percentage of nominal GDP) depends implicitly on the following parameters:
Ln (RAT) = 10.1 -1.19 * Ln (GDP per capita) + Ln (ε) .
R-squared: 0.733
D-W: 1.61
P-significance of both coeff.: 0.001.
It is worth mentioning that until 2003 the logic of GDP per capita was not used so aggressively
as an instrument for the allocation of both the CAP and the structural funds. The regressions
reveal that the Commission changed its strategy quite significantly with the coming
enlargement.
What concerns the private transfers, it can be expected that the EU enlargement will
raise substantially the importance of workers’ remittances to home countries. Slovenia and
Latvia were the only EU acceding and candidate countries, where in 2002 the net private
transfers were higher (by a small margin) than $100 per capita.  The amounts for the rest of the
countries were even lower: $35 in Slovakia, around $44 in Hungary, Lithuania and $55 in
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland and Romania.  For a comparison, the workers’ remittances in
Portugal were $286 for 2002.
                                                
14 These are the figures in Table 5 in the third line from the bottom.Recently the net private transfers have been growing rapidly in some acceding countries:
thus in Latvia, Estonia or the Czech Republic the surplus more than doubled in a year. This
growth may accelerate after May 2004 when employment of their nationals in some EU
countries or in some professions will becomes legal.  However, according to most estimates, the
EU enlargement is not expected to result in high labour migration from the new EU members,
even after the labour market of the enlarged EU is fully deregulated after 2010. As it was
estimated by Boeri and Brücker, 2001, and later updated in a report for the European
Commission, 15 such migration in the first years can be expected to add annually a mere 0.2%
to the labour supply in the current 15 EU members, subject to a declining trend.  The labour
mobility in the new EU member countries can be expected to be even lower than it was among
the old EU members.  
The Southeast European countries have traditionally reported higher net private transfers
than the central European economies. Thus in Albania, The former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia the net private transfers per capita in 2002 were
between $168 and $238.  The net position of the 15 east European countries on the account of
current transfers for 2003 is estimated at $13 billion, of which $7 billion pertains to the seven
Southeast European economies.  For these economies net private transfers are an extremely
important source of financing the deficit in other current transactions: thus in 2002, the surplus
on the balance of transfers covered 39 per cent of their total trade deficit.
5. Conclusion
The overall situation in the sustainability of current account deficits in studied transition
countries of Central, Baltic and South-Eastern Europe can be characterised generally as steadily
improving. The majority of its economies reached a stage where the current account is not an
immanent threat to their growth any longer. Even though the vast majority of transition
countries are not fundamentally constrained in their development by the lack of funds for
investment and restructuring, and therefore by the need to import the capital from abroad, their
current accounts will remain in deficit for long time.
What matters at this stage is not so much the fine-tuning of the current account
structures, as it is the need for adjustments in fiscal policies. It is apparent that government
deficits, that have been on a rise in the last 2-3 years, are becoming the dominant factors behind
the current account disequlibria. Therefore economic policies in many countries will need
important adjustments in order to keep the economies in macroeconomic equilibrium. The
tendencies to building-up the welfare state, postponed reforms in the pension and the health
systems will have to be fundamentally reformed also due to their negative impacts on the
external equilibrium. At the same time it is evident that reinvested profits of foreign investors
and current transfers are taking over gradually the role of bringing the current account deficits
closer (but not fully) to their sustainable levels.
                                                
15 T. Boeri and H. Brücker, “Eastern Enlargement and EU Labour Markets”, World Economics, Vol. 2,
No. 1, 2001, pp. 49-68 and  H. Brücker et. Al., Potential Migration from Central and Eastern Europe
into the EU-15 – An Update. Report for the European Commission, DIW Berlin, March, 2003.TABLE 1: Current account balances of Eastern Europe, 2001-2003       (in million dollars or in  per cent)
Million dollars Per cent of GDP Net FDI/current account  %  a)
Jan.-Sep. Jan.-Sep. Jan.-Sep. Country
2001 2002 2002 2003 2001 2002 2002 2003 2002 2002 2003
Eastern Europe   -21751 -25913 -16394 -19259 -4,7 -5,0 -4,5 -4,4 92 113 53
Albania -218 -407 -286 -258 -5,1 -8,4 -7,9 -5,8 33 33 42
Bosnia and Herzegovina -1305 -1729 -1098 -1402 -27,9 -31,9 -27,5 -28,3 17 16 15
Bulgaria -842 -713 -78 -833 -6,2 -4,6 -0,7 -5,9 123 811 109
Croatia   -725 -1908 -869 -523 -3,7 -8,5 -5,3 -2,5 31 31 218
Czechia -3273 -4415 -3179 -3662 -5,4 -6,0 -6,3 -5,9 204 251 106
Estonia -339 -799 -525 -898 -6,0 -12,3 -11,0 -14,6 19 20 58
Hungary b   -1754 -2655 -1369 -3883 -3,4 -4,1 -3,0 -6,5 22 35 ..
Latvia -732 -647 -409 -650 -9,6 -7,7 -6,8 -9,0 58 83 34
Lithuania -574 -734 -390 -755 -4,8 -5,3 -3,9 -5,9 97 138 13
Poland -7166 -6700 -4887 -2964 -3,9 -3,5 -3,6 -2,0 57 51 74
Romania -2223 -1525 -948 -1831 -5,5 -3,3 -3,1 -4,8 74 85 58
Serbia and Montenegro -648 -1731 -1265 -1391 -5,7 -11,0 -10,9 -9,6 27 25 63
Slovakia -1746 -1939 -1211 -73 -8,4 -8,0 -6,9 -0,3 207 278 650
Slovenia   37 314 321 65  0,2 1,4 2,0 0,3 .. .. ..
Macedonia -244 -325 -201 -203 -7,1 -8,8 -7,4 -6,0 24 32 17
Memorandum items:
Accession countries-8 -15546 -17576 -11648 -12818 -4,3 -4,4 -4,1 -3,8 115 139 45
     Baltic states   -1644 -2180 -1324 -2302 -6,5 -7,6 -6,4 -8,8 57 74 37
     Central Europe   -13902 -15396 -10324 -10516 -4,1 -4,1 -3,9 -3,3 123 147 47
South-east Europe    -6205 -8337 -4746 -6441 -6,4 -7,4 -5,9 -6,4 43 50 67
     Source:  UNECE calculations, based on national balance of payments statistics; IMF; Staff Country Reports (Washington, D.C.) for
Bosnia and Herzegovina; Quarterly Report on Inflation (Budapest), November 2003, pp. 51-53.
     a  This ratio is calculated only when net FDI is positive and the current account balance is negative.
     b Excludes reinvested profits (a net outflow); otherwise the Hungarian current account deficit in per cent of GDP would be approximately -
5.8% in 2001, -6.1% in 2002 and -8.6% in 2003 (according to the estimates of the Hungarian National Bank).TABLE 2: Visible exports of central/Eastern Europe, Russia and Ukraine, 1993-2002(in Billion dollars)





CEECs-12 66,9 77,3 100,6 107,1 115,9 127,9 125,5 141,9 157,3 178,8 267,4% 10,9%
Albania 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 268,3% 11,0%
Bulgaria 3,8 3,9 5,4 4,9 4,9 4,2 4,0 4,8 5,1 5,7 150,9% 4,6%
Croatia 3,7 4,3 4,6 4,5 4,2 4,5 4,3 4,4 4,7 4,9 132,1% 3,1%
Czechia 14,5 15,9 21,3 22,2 22,8 26,4 26,3 29,1 33,4 38,4 265,5% 10,9%
Estonia 0,8 1,3 1,8 2,1 2,9 3,2 2,9 3,2 3,3 3,4 426,8% 16,1%
Hungary 8,9 10,7 12,9 15,7 19,1 23,0 25,0 28,1 30,5 34,3 384,9% 15,0%
Latvia 1,4 1,0 1,3 1,4 1,7 1,8 1,7 1,9 2,0 2,3 162,7% 5,4%
Lithuania 2,0 2,0 2,7 3,4 3,9 3,7 3,0 3,8 4,6 5,5 276,7% 11,3%
Poland 14,2 17,2 22,9 24,4 25,8 28,2 27,4 31,7 36,1 41,0 288,8% 11,8%
Romania 4,9 6,2 7,9 8,1 8,4 8,3 8,5 10,4 11,4 13,9 283,5% 11,6%
Slovakia 5,5 6,7 8,6 8,8 9,6 10,8 10,3 11,9 12,7 14,5 266,3% 10,9%
Slovenia 6,1 6,8 8,3 8,3 8,4 9,1 8,6 8,7 9,3 10,4 170,3% 5,9%
Russia 67,3 67,8 82,4 90,6 86,9 74,4 75,6 105,0 101,6 106,9 158,8% 5,1%
Ukraine 7,8 10,3 13,1 14,4 14,2 12,6 11,6 14,6 16,3 18,0 229,7% 9,2%
Source: UN and WTO World Trade Statistics, 2003TABLE 3: International Trade in Merchanise of Some Transition Countries   (in USD billions or percentages)
                  
     EXPORTS (X) IMPORTS (M) (X-M)/GDP
Country/  Region     Forecast Growth Growth X/GDP  Forecast Growth Growth M/GDP   
   2001 2002 2003 2003/2002 2003/2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2003/2002 2003/2002 2003 2002 2003
     $ $ $ % nomin. % real * % $ $ $ % nomin. % real * % % %
Czechia  33,4 38,4 48,5 126,4 106,2 56,0 36,5 40,8 51,1 125,2 105,2 58,9 -3,3 -2,9
Estonia  3,3 3,4 4,5 131,1 110,2 54,3 4,3 4,8 6,5 135,5 113,9 79,2 -21,5 -24,9
Hungary  30,5 34,4 41,1 119,4 100,3 51,2 33,7 37,6 47,2 125,6 105,5 58,9 -4,9 -7,7
Poland  36,1 41,0 52,1 127,1 106,8 26,2 50,3 55,1 66,7 121,1 101,8 33,5 -7,5 -7,3
Slovakia    12,7 14,5 20,3 140,0 117,6 64,8 14,7 16,5 22,7 137,4 115,5 72,4 -8,3 -7,6
Eastern Europe-15 157,3 178,8 225,8 126,3 106,1 38,3 202,1 226,3 285,8 126,3 106,1 48,5 -9,2 -10,2
Central Eur.-5   121,9 138,6 176,2 127,1 106,8 41,9 145,3 161,0 201,6 125,2 105,2 48,0 -6,0 -6,0
South-East Eur.-7 25,4 29,0 37,0 127,6 107,2 27,6 42,7 48,7 62,7 128,7 108,2 46,8 -17,4 -19,2
Baltic states-3   9,9 11,2 14,9 132,8 111,6 42,4 14,2 16,6 21,6 130,3 109,5 61,7 -18,8 -19,3
Russian Federation 101,6 106,9 134,7 126,0 105,9 32,2 53,8 60,5 74,2 122,6 103,0 17,7 13,4 14,5
Sources: National statistics; UN ECE statistical report, 2004, and own estimation from October 2003 statistics..
* Remark: US $ depreciated relative to euro (main trade currency of these countries) by 17% in 2003.
Thus the real growth in trade in constant euros (e.g. free of 2% inflation) is signirficantly lower than what the nominal USD indicate for 2003.TABLE 4: Current account balances of central and Eastern European countries (CEEC-15), 1990-2002
                                                                                                                                                   (Million dollars, current prices)
Country / region 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Albania -118 -168 -51 19 31 37 -62 -254 -65 -133 -163 -218 -407
Bosnia and Herzegovina .. .. .. .. -177 -193 -748 -1060 -1093 -1386 -1087 -1305 -1729
Bulgaria -1710 -77 -360 -1098 -32 -198 164 1046 -61 -652 -704 -842 -713
Croatia a -621 -589 329 637 711 -1407 -956 -2512 -1453 -1397 -459 -725 -1908
Czechia -122 1708 -456 456 -787 -1369 -4121 -3564 -1255 -1462 -2718 -3273 -4415
Estonia .. .. 36 22 -167 -158 -398 -563 -478 -247 -294 -339 -799
Hungary b 123 267 325 -3455 -3911 -1605 -1146 -676 -2223 -2435 -2900 -1754 -2655
Latvia .. .. 191 417 201 -16 -279 -345 -650 -654 -493 -732 -647
Lithuania .. .. 321 -86 -94 -614 -723 -981 -1298 -1194 -675 -574 -734
Poland b 716 -1359 -269 -2868 677 5310 -1371 -4309 -6841 -11553 -9952 -7166 -6700
Romania -3337 -1012 -1564 -1174 -428 -1774 -2571 -2104 -2917 -1437 -1355 -2223 -1525
Serbia and Montenegro .. .. .. .. -400 -1037 -1317 -1279 -660 -716 -350 -648 -1731
Slovakia -767 -786 173 -532 759 511 -1960 -1827 -1982 -980 -702 -1746 -1939
Slovenia a 518 129 926 192 575 -75 56 51 -118 -698 -548 37 314
Macedonia a -409 -259 -19 -83 -263 -299 -340 -286 -270 -32 -72 -244 -325
Memorandum items:
CEECs - 15 .. .. .. .. -3304 -2888 -15773 -18664 -21364 -24975 -22472 -21751 -25913
EU accession countries-8 .. .. 1247 -5854 -2746 1983 -9943 -12215 -14845 -19223 -18282 -15546 -17576
     Baltic states   .. .. 548 353 -59 -788 -1400 -1890 -2426 -2095 -1462 -1644 -2180
     Central Europe   469 -41 698 -6207 -2687 2772 -8543 -10325 -12418 -17128 -16819 -13902 -15396
South-east Europe    .. .. .. .. -557 -4871 -5830 -6449 -6519 -5753 -4190 -6205 -8337
Russia d -6300 2500 1142 12792 7844 6963 10847 -80 219 24616 46839 33795 29520
All 27 transit. countries c .. .. .. .. 1392 853 -10839 -25112 -28593 -1516 25815 11077 4899
     Source:  National balance of payments statistics; IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics  (Washington, D.C.),  Staff Country Reports
     a Excludes transactions with the republics of the former SFR of Yugoslavia: Croatia (1990-1992), Slovenia (1990-1991) and Macedonia
     b Convertible currencies.  Hungary until 1995; Poland until 1992.
     c Totals include estimates for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.TABLE 5: Appropriations of accession countries from the European Commission
                 cummulated for 2004-2006                                    (In mil. EUR, 1999 prices)
Payments from EC Czech. Poland Hung. Slovak. Sloven. Eston. Latvia Lith. Cyprus Malta TOTAL Remark
Agriculture 1120 4636 1483 628 401 254 401 725 115 28 9791
Structural policy 2328 11369 2847 1560 405 618 1036 1366 101 79 21709
Internal policy 419 1817 559 329 222 127 175 539 48 20 4255
Cash 747 1443 211 86 233 22 26 48 338 232 3386
Administ. and tech. support - - - - - - - - - - 1711  /*1
TOTAL (mil. Eur) 4614 19265 5100 2603 1261 1021 1638 2678 602 359 40852
Number of inhabitants 10,2 38,7 10,2 5,4 2 1,4 2,4 3,5 0,76 0,39 74,95
GDP in 2001 (in bn EUR) 63,3 196,6 58,0 22,8 20,9 6,2 8,5 13,4 10,2 4,1 404 /*2
GDP per capita 6206 5080 5686 4222 10450 4429 3542 3829 13421 10513 5390
Total receipts / per capita 452 498 500 482 631 729 683 765 792 921 545
Agriculture/ per capita 110 120 145 116 201 181 167 207 151 72 131
Structural funds./ per capita 228 294 279 289 203 441 432 390 133 203 290
Internal policy / per capita 41 47 55 61 111 91 73 154 63 51 57
Cash/ per capita 73 37 21 16 117 16 11 14 445 595 45
Total receipts/GDP (p.a. in %) 2,47 3,33 2,98 3,87 2,05 5,59 6,54 6,78 2,00 2,97 3,43 /*3
Agric./GDP (annually in %) 0,60 0,80 0,87 0,93 0,65 1,39 1,60 1,84 0,38 0,23 0,82 /*3
Struct./GDP (annually in %) 1,25 1,96 1,67 2,32 0,66 3,38 4,14 3,46 0,34 0,65 1,82 /*3
Internal/GDP (annually in %) 0,22 0,31 0,33 0,49 0,36 0,70 0,70 1,37 0,16 0,17 0,36 /*3
Cash/GDP (annually in %) 0,40 0,25 0,12 0,13 0,38 0,12 0,10 0,12 1,12 1,92 0,28 /*3
Source: Statistics of the European Commission on Enlargement, December, 2003 
/*1  Including structural funds of 38 mil. EUR non-allocated by countries
/*2  Based on current exchange rate
/*3  The transfers for 2004 (since 1 May) were taken for 2/3 of a year.
In addition, the following assumptions were taken for estimating the GDP growth in nominal prices in 2005:
•  the inflation of euro from 1999 was 1.5% per year;
•  the growth of GDP in accession countries (for 2002-2005) was 3.4% p.a.;
•  the real appreciation of domestic currencies to euro was 1.4% p.a. (according to Balassa-Samuelson effect).TABLE 6: Comparison of the national appropriations from the EU funds with the average total payments
       calculated in terms of per capita and per GDP       (In indexes with the base of unity)
Payments from EC Czech. Poland Hung. Slovak. Sloven. Eston. Latvia Lithu. Cypr. Malta TOTAL
Total receipts / per capita 0,83 0,91 0,92 0,88 1,16 1,34 1,25 1,40 1,45 1,69 1,00
Agricult./ per capita 0,84 0,92 1,11 0,89 1,53 1,39 1,28 1,59 1,16 0,55 1,00
Struct./ per capita 0,79 1,01 0,96 1,00 0,70 1,52 1,49 1,35 0,46 0,70 1,00
Internal / per capita 0,72 0,83 0,97 1,07 1,96 1,60 1,28 2,71 1,11 0,90 1,00
Cash/ per capita 1,62 0,83 0,46 0,35 2,58 0,35 0,24 0,30 9,84 13,17 1,00
Total receipts/GDP (p.a. in %) 0,72 0,97 0,87 1,13 0,60 1,63 1,91 1,98 0,58 0,87 1,00
Agric./GDP (annually in %) 0,73 0,97 1,06 1,14 0,79 1,69 1,95 2,23 0,47 0,28 1,00
Struct./GDP (annually in %) 0,68 1,08 0,91 1,27 0,36 1,85 2,27 1,90 0,18 0,36 1,00
Internal/GDP (annually in %) 0,63 0,88 0,92 1,37 1,01 1,94 1,95 3,82 0,45 0,46 1,00
Cash/GDP (annually in %) 1,41 0,88 0,43 0,45 1,33 0,42 0,36 0,43 3,95 6,75 1,00
Source: Statistics of the European Commission on Enlargement, December, 2003Dosud vyšlo :
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